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IN THE ZONE: WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
SIGN THE PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE
Erik A. Cornelliert
Abstract: U.S. officials are moving away from supporting international law as a
mechanism for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For
example, the Bush Administration recently refused to sign the Protocol to the Southeast
Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone ("SEANWFZ"). U.S. officials, relying on a policy of
nuclear deterrence, maintain that this treaty unnecessarily limits freedom of navigation,
creates the possibility of territorial disputes, and accords overly broad negative security
assurances to the region. This Comment argues that these concerns are unfounded, and
that signing the Protocol would promote U.S. and world security.
Successful
implementation of SEANWFZ, which requires support from nuclear-weapons states,
would promote Southeast Asian security by stabilizing a regime that enhances regional
confidence and cooperation. Moreover, signing this protocol is in accord with the United
States' duties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to support
the spread of regional nuclear-weapon free zones and provide legally binding negative
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states. This Comment concludes that the
United States government should sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone because international law is a more effective mechanism than nuclear
deterrence for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of nuclear weapons has changed the face of international
warfare. Even the smallest nuclear weapons have the power to level cities,
killing thousands in the initial blast and leaving others to suffer from
lingering radiation. t Currently, stockpiles of nuclear weapons are held by
only a few nuclear-weapons states, but the spread of nuclear technology to
additional states is of great concern to most nations, both nuclear-weapons
states and the majority of non-nuclear weapon states.2
International law may be the most effective mechanism for limiting
the spread of nuclear weapons. However, it will only be effective if the
United States and other nuclear-weapons states consent to bind themselves
t The author would like to thank Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., and professors Christopher
Jones and Joan Fitzpatrick for their teaching and support. The author would also like to thank the staff of
the PacificRim Law and Policy Journal for their diligent efforts.
1 For a detailed discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear war, see Stephen Dycus,
Nuclear War: Still the Gravest Threatto the Environment, 25 VT. L. REV. 753 (2001).
2 RICHARD BUTLER, FATAL CHOICE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ILLUSION OF MISSILE DEFENSE
11(2001).
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to international law by reducing current stockpiles and agreeing not to strike
non-nuclear weapons states in exchange for the promise that non-nuclear
weapons states will not acquire nuclear weapons.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") is
the ultimate "bargain" for global denuclearization. 3 It requires non-nuclear
states to remain without nuclear weapons, and it calls on nuclear-weapons
states to dispose of all of their weapons.4 The United States was a leader in
forming the NPT after recognizing that the uncontrolled spread of nuclear
weapons threatened U.S. security. The Clinton Administration was the main
sponsor for indefinite extension of the NPT during the 1995 review.5 The
Bush Administration, however, is unsupportive of the NPT and other arms
control treaties because the Administration favors U.S. sovereignty and
flexibility over relying on international law to stem proliferation.6
Thus, the United States has taken definitive steps backtracking from
supporting international arms control in recent years, projecting instead a
policy of unilateralism. 7 First, the Senate inflicted a major blow to the
global non-proliferation regime by refusing to ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty ("CTBT") against the Clinton Administration's
advice in 1999.8 Second, the Nuclear Posture Review by the Department of
Defense called for a resumption of nuclear testing to develop "bunkerbusting" mini-nukes for use in battle against stores of chemical and
biological weapons. 9 Third, in 2001 President Bush notified Russia that the
1°
United States was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signatureJuly 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
4 Id. art. II, VI. For a more extensive discussion of the NPT, see infra Part IIn.
' United Nations Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 959, 970 [hereinafter Final Document).
Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 35.
7 Id. at 31-3 2,35.
8 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439; CTBT Prep Chief To
Work on Putting Treaty in Effect, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 23, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File. The
CTBT prohibits nuclear explosions, establishes a multinational monitoring network, and provides for onsite challenge inspections. Id.
9 Thalif Deen, Disarmament: U.N. OffJicial Criticizes New U.S. Nuclear Posture, INTER PRESS
SERV., Mar. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
10 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1973, U.S.-USSR, 23 U.S.T.
3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Robert J. Saiget, U.S. Says It Won't Withdraw from
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Apr. 4, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File. In
general, the ABM treaty prevented the United States and Russia from developing and deploying antiballistic missile defense technology. ABM Treaty, supra. President Bush announced that the United States
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001, and withdrawal became effective six
months later in June 2002. James M. Lindsay & Michael E. O'Hanlon, Missile Defense After the ABM
Treaty, WASH. Q. 163 (2002), LEXIS, News Group File. Thirty-one members of the House of
Representatives filed a lawsuit against the Bush Administration contending that the President needs
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which is considered by many to be the "cornerstone" of international arms
control law.I I
Although President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin

recently signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ("SORT") 12 in
May 2002 to reduce the U.S. and Russian arsenals to 1100 warheads or less,

commentators believe that this treaty is an insignificant step toward nonproliferation because the treaty allows both parties
to keep thousands of
3
weapons in storage for redeployment in the future.'
Critics argue that the Bush Administration's nuclear arms control
policy is hypocritical because it calls for global non-proliferation while the
United States maintains a policy of unilateral nuclear deterrence. Deterrence
involves attempting to frighten hostile states from attacking by threatening
them with nuclear retaliation. 14 The Bush Administration favors keeping
nuclear weapons as a stick to wave at potential challengers.' 5 Based on this
policy, U.S. officials promote agreements that limit the arsenals of other
states while preserving U.S. stockpiles. 16
The desire to preserve nuclear deterrence has prompted U.S. officials
to withhold their support of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty ("SEANWFZ"), otherwise known as the Treaty of Bangkok. 17 U.S.
concerns include the effect the treaty will have on freedom of navigation,
congressional approval before the United States can withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Court Ruling on
ABM Treaty Lawsuit Expected Within a Few Weeks, AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 4, 2002, at 1, LEXIS, News
Group File. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the lawsuit on December 30,
2002, but Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) plans to appeal the decision. Mark Selinger, Lawmaker to
Appeal Dismissal of ABM Treaty Lawsuit, AEROSPACE DAILY, Jan. 3, 2003, at 6, LEXIS, News Group File.
11 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (2002). Also consistent with these moves away from formal nuclear arms
control agreements, the Bush Administration refuses to support ratification of the Biological Weapons
Convention, which prohibits the development and use of biological weapons. Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, openedfor signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Michael
Barletta et al., Keeping Track ofAnthrax: The Case For a Biosecurity Convention, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, May 1, 2002, at 57, LEXIS, News Group File.
12 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive
Reductions, May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russ., S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-8 [hereinafter SORT].
13 See, e.g., Wade Boese & J. Peter Scoblic, The Jury is Still Out, ARMS CONTROL TODAY 4, 4-6,
(2000); SORT, supra note 12.
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, More May Be Better, in THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 1, 3
(1995)' BUTLER,
supra note 2, at 13-16.
1" Id. at 27 ("There is perhaps one other related thought process ...
the idea that arms control is
good, provided it controls the arms of others, but not ours.").
? Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec.15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
[hereinafter SEANWFZ]. The member states are listed in Article I(a), and include: Brunei Darussalarn,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Id.
art. I(a). See generally Mark E. Rosen, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: Time for a Fresh Look, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 29 (1997).
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prohibitions on using or threatening to use nuclear weapons within certain
8
zones, and the potential for territorial disputes over zonal boundaries.
This Comment argues that the United States should sign the Protocol
to SEANWFZ. Part II provides an overview of the purposes of nuclearweapon-free-zones ("NWFZs") and the history of their development. Part
III explains the relationship between NWFZs and the NPT. The history and
specific provisions of SEANWFZ are described in Part IV. Part V argues
that the policy of nuclear deterrence underpinning the Bush Administration's
Finally, Part VI
refusal to support SEANWFZ is counter-productive.
concludes that the United States should sign the Protocol to SEANWFZ.
Part VI also addresses the Bush Administration's specific concerns with the
treaty and outlines the advantages of signing the Protocol.
II.

DEFINTION, PURPOSES, AND HISTORY OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREEZONE TREATIES

A.

Definition ofNuclear-Weapon-FreeZones

NWFZs are treaty agreements that define particular regions that
members have agreed to keep free from nuclear weapons. Such agreements
prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons in certain territories and include
verification measures to ensure compliance. The United Nations General
Assembly defines NWFZs as:
[A]ny zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise
of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or
convention whereby:
a) The [status] of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the
zone shall -be subject, including the procedure for the
delimitation of the zone is defined;
b) An international system of verification and control is
established to guarantee compliance with the obligations
deriving from that [status]. 19
NWFZs effectively enable countries to regulate and prohibit nuclear
activity. 20 NWFZs limit proliferation by prohibiting possession, testing,
IS Rosen, supra note 17, at 62-67.

See infra Part VI.A for a discussion of U.S. concerns regarding

SEANWFZ.
19 G.A. Res. 3472, U.N. GAOR, 30th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/100034 (1976).
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deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. 2 NWFZs go beyond mere nonproliferation 22 because they also ban the deployment of strategic weapons by
nuclear-weapons states within defined territories. 23 In effect, parties to
24 a
NWFZ cannot allow foreign states to place nuclear weapons in the zone.
B.

History of Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZones

Arms control became an important aspect of security studies as the
arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union charged
forward. 25 As a result of fears about the arms race, many non-nuclearweapons states, especially those states located in conflict areas between
nuclear powers, advanced NWFZs to reduce the risk of proliferation and
instability caused by the potential deployment of nuclear weapons on their
soil. 26 Today, 108 countries on four continents are members of multilateral
NWFZ treaties.27
NWFZs cover both inhabited and uninhabited territories. Treaties for
uninhabited territories include the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,28 the Outer
20 See generally Ramesh Thakur, Stepping Stones to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, in NUCLEAR

WEAPONS-FREE ZONES 3, 6-7 (Ramesh Thakur ed., 1998).
21 Id.at 7.
22 Non-proliferation refers to preventing the wider dispersal of nuclear weapons to states that
currently do not possess them. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 11.
23 Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Prospects and Probles, 20
DISARMAMENT 71, 74 (1997).
24 BILVEER SINGH, ASEAN, THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE, AND
THE
CHALLENGE OF DENUCLEARISATION INSOUTHEAST ASIA 25 (2000).
25 See generally RicHARD SMOKE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE COLD WAR 125-48 (1993) (outlining the early
histor of the development of nuclear arms control).
6 SINGH, supra note 24, at 23-24.
27 Thakur, supra note 20, at 5. SEANWFZ was signed by Brunei Darussalem,
Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones (NWFZs), at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/9707nwfz.pdf at 40-42 (last visited Nov. 11,
2002). The Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed by Antigua and Bermuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. The Treaty of Pelindaba was signed by Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chomoros, Congo, Cote
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id.
Finally, the Treaty of Rarotonga includes Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. Id. See id. for a chart of the signatories of each of the four main NWFZs.
28 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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Space Treaty of 1967,29 the Seabed Treaty of 1972,30 and the Moon Treaty

of 1979. 3 1 Four primary NWFZs cover inhabited areas: the Treaty of
Tlatelolco made Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1967;32 the
South Pacific became nuclear-free in 1985 when the Treaty of Raratonga
entered into force; 33 Southeast Asia followed suit in 1995 with
SEANWFZ;34 finally, Africa formed the Treaty of Pelindaba in 1996. 35 Five
Central Asian States hope to form a new nuclear-weapon-free zone in April
2003.36

Each treaty covering a populated area also includes a protocol for
Protocol signatories promise to uphold the
requirements of
the
treaty
and
to provide negative security assurances38 to
39
nuclear-weapons states. 37
member states.
C.

Advantages of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Nuclear-weapon-free zones facilitate non-proliferation, regional
security, confidence building, and economic stability. 40 NWFZs thus
alleviate regional insecurities and allow member states to avoid
41 the
economic and environmental costs of nuclear weapons development.

29

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,

Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, openedfor signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967).
30 The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
31 Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5,
1979, 1363
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 11, 1984).
32 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S.
362.
33 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S.
177.
34 SEANWFZ, supra note 17.
35 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, June 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M.
698.
36 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are
working with nuclearweapons states to draft language for the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Central Asian
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Consultative Meeting Held at Headquarters 17 December, M2 PRESSWIRE,
Dec. 20, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
37 For a chart listing dates of signature by nuclear-weapons states for each Protocol, see Thakur,
supra note 20, at 5.
38 Negative security assurances are commitments by nuclear states to refrain from
using nuclear
weapons against other states. Ben Sanders, Global Nuclear Issues in the Asia-Pacific Regional Context:
Security Assurances and Regional Stability, 28 DISARMAMENT 1, 2 (1995). See infra Parts II.B, VI.A.3,
and VI.B.2 for discussions of the importance of negative security assurances in the NPT and SEANWFZ.
39 Thakur, supra note 20, at 7.
4 See id. at 27-29.
41
See id. at 8.
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First, NWFZ treaties represent an affirmative agreement to
institutionalize non-proliferation by means of a vigorous enforcement
system. NWFZs focus on nuclear weapons themselves instead of underlying
conflicts between nations. 42 As a result, the treaties minimize the impacts of43
warfare without overtly addressing the deeper causes of conflicts.

Signatory nations to NWFZs take a concrete stance against the placement of
nuclear weapons in their region.44 NWFZs remind the world that many
countries have rejected the nuclear option,4 5 further marginalizing the theory
that nuclear weapons are effective tools of national power through nuclear
deterrence. 46 NWFZs institutionalize non-proliferation efforts by bolstering

promises not to acquire nuclear weapons under the NPT and by creating a
movement toward global disarmament, even in an era where it seems that
nuclear-weapons states are not yet willing to make major reductions.4 7
Second, NWFZ treaties are effective because they create enforcement
mechanisms for non-proliferation beyond those that are available under the
NPT.48 NWFZs set up systems of regional verification 449 to monitor and
enforce compliance with international arms control agreements.50
Verification measures in NWFZs go beyond the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") safeguard system under the NPT by adding zonal
monitoring systems. 51
Third, non-nuclear-weapons states are motivated to form NWFZs with
their neighbors because NWFZs increase regional security. 52 NWFZs are
preventive measures that stabilize the non-nuclear status quo and allow
parties to avoid regional involvement in a war between nuclear powers.53
42

For example, SEANWFZ minimizes the impact of a possible conflict over territory in the South

China Seas by preventing parties from using nuclear weapons, instead of resolving the underlying territorial
disputes. SINGH, supra note 24, at 51. ASEAN leaders promised China that SEANWFZ would not affect
existing territorial boundaries. Id.
. Thakur, supra note 20, at 8.
44 Norachit Sinhaseni, Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Next Steps, 20 DISARMAMENT
63, 70 (1997).
45 Id.
46 Id.; Thakur, supra note 20, at 23.
47 Thakur, supra note 20, at 24. See also Zachary S. Davis, The Spread of Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones: Building a New Nuclear Bargain, 26 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 16, 18 (1996).
48 All current NWFZs include significant safeguards. Thakur, supra note 20,
at 17-18.
'9 Verification refers to the methods used by nations to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted
from peaceful nuclear activities to military uses. Id. at 16-18.
o Thakur, supra note 20, at 16-17.
51 Enkhsaikhan, supra note 23, at 75. IAEA safeguards focus on preventing diversion of nuclear
material to weapons production, while zonal monitoring systems additionally seek to prevent importation,
testing, manufacture, and use of nuclear weapons. Id. IAEA safeguards were created pursuant to the NPT,
so they predate the formation ofmanyNWFZs. NPT, supra note 3, art. III.
'2
Thakur, supra note 20, at 8.
53 Id.
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Parties also avoid the economic and social costs of regional nuclear arms
races. 54 NWFZs are effective confidence-building measures that reduce
regional tension.5 5 NWFZs are also legal mechanisms for member states to
show their peaceful intentions, which builds regional cooperation in the
process. 56
For example, SEANWFZ built 57confidence and regional
cooperation on security issues in Southeast Asia.
Finally, NWFZs duplicate and reinforce the basic principles
underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT").
III.

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE

ZONES

AND

THE

NON-PROLIFERATION

TREATY
The importance of NWFZs in today's security environment is
integrally connected with the development of the NPT because both
instruments secure regional non-proliferation commitments. While the NPT
is incomplete without legally binding negative security assurances from
nuclear-weapons states, NWFZ treaties fulfill this function.
A.

The Non-ProliferationTreaty

The NPT, the centerpiece of global nonproliferation law, was
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not have
nuclear weapons at the time of its inception. 8 Article I requires nuclearweapons states to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclearweapons states, or from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclearweapons state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.5 9 Article II
addresses the behavior of non-nuclear-weapons States Parties, prohibiting
them from receiving or manufacturing nuclear weapons. 60 Article III creates
safeguards to ensure compliance, including verification procedures
administered by the IAEA. 6 1 Finally, Article VII guarantees the right to
54 id.
55 Enkhsaikhan, supra note 23, at 71; see also Thakur, supra note 20, at 8; U.N. GAOR, 10th Spec.
Sess., Supp. No. 4, paras. 63-64, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/4 (1978).
56 Thakur, supra note 20, at 28.
57 See infra notes 97, 148-149 and accompanying text (arguing that SEANWFZ was formed through
extensive cooperation and supports regional security in Southeast Asia).
58 Ambassador Thomas Graham, who promoted indefinite extension of the NPT, stated that "the
NPT, is, after the United Nations charter itself, the central document of world peace and security." Thomas
Graham, Jr., The 1995 NPT Review Conference: Future Implications, in PULLING BACK FROM THE
NUCLEAR BRINK: REDUCING AND COUNTERING NUCLEAR THREATS 189 (Barry R. Schneider ed., 1998).

59 NPT, supra note 3, art I.
60 Id. art II.

61 Id. art IIl.
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create NWFZs by stating that "[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of
any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to
62 assure the total
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.,
The NPT's success is due in part to its large membership.63 Today,
there are five official nuclear-weapons states that are party to the NPT 6 4 and

three states that are not party to the NPT but possess nuclear capabilities.65
Thus, with 186 member states, it stands as a symbol
of the world's
66
commitment to ending widespread nuclear proliferation.
The NPT remains important despite the recent acquisition of nuclear
weapons by India and Pakistan.67 This setback does not outweigh the NPT's
success as many nations have abandoned their nuclear weapons while others
have ceased trying to acquire them.68

The NPT deters countries from

acquiring nuclear weapons because
69 violators must contend with the strong
global sentiment for disarmament.
Despite its success, several countries 70 criticized the NPT because

they viewed it as a discriminatory tool. 71 According to this criticism, the
NPT was drafted to favor the five official nuclear-weapons states: the
United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France. 72 First, critics argue that
the NPT was based on Cold War strategic alliance relationships, and it
Id. art VII.
63 SMOKE,supra note 25, at 145-147. The NPT includes 181 non-nuclear weapons states and five
nuclear-weapons states, which covers the whole world excluding Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba, and North
Korea. GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 327; N. Korean FM Tells UN Nuclear Pact Pull-out Effective From
Saturday, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 11, 2003, LEXIS, News Group File (North Korea announced its
intention to withdraw from the NPT as of January 11, 2003).
' The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are the official nuclearweapons states under the NPT. GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 257.
65 The three so-called nuclear-capable states that are not party to the NPT are India, Pakistan, and
Israel. See id. at 327.
6
SMOKE, supra note 25, at 145-47.
67 General John M. Shalikashvili, Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 20. For example,
South Africa had nuclear weapons, but it disassembled and destroyed them to become a member of the
NPT. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 7.
68 Shalikashvili, supra note 67, at 20.
69 SMOKE, supra note 25, at 146.
70 Of the original sponsors of the NPT, Germany, Italy, and Sweden were not confident that it would
62

be verifiable until a provision requiring review after 25 years before indefinite extension was added to
alleviate their concerns. GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 25. The NPT had more critics at the time of the
Review Conference, which mainly consisted of states in the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM"). Id. at 260.
These countries were led by Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, and Malaysia during negotiations, and they used the
NPT extension issue to leverage progress on disarmament from nuclear-weapons states. Id. at 260. The
NPT extension debate is further explained in this section and the following section of this Comment.
7' The actions of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq show the importance of addressing these
concerns. SINGH, supra note 24, at 7-11.
72 Id. at 7.
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granted special treatment in terms of technology transfers.73 For example,
Article IX(3) defines a nuclear-weapons state as "one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to 1 January, 1967." 74 In effect, this provision preserves the
superiority of the nuclear powers at the time the treaty was signed while
prohibiting subsequent acquisition by states without nuclear weapons. 75
Second, the structure of the original draft of the NPT arguably
preserved the right of proliferation for states that already possessed nuclear
weapons.76 Many developing countries objected that the arms race between
current nuclear-weapons states was equally as dangerous as proliferation to
new states, since the United States and the Soviets already
77 had enough
nuclear weapons to threaten the existence of the entire planet.
The drafters of the NPT anticipated the concerns about discrimination
and attempted to address those concerns by including a provision requiring
disarmament of nuclear-weapons states and periodic review of the
agreement. First, Article VI requires parties to "pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament. ' 78 Second, the NPT also includes
a review provision that limited its enforceability to twenty-five years, after
which members would negotiate whether to extend it indefinitely. 79 This
provision gave suspicious states an opportunity to withdraw from the treaty
if they felt the bargain was ineffective.
Pursuant to the review provision, the parties met in 1995 for the
Review Conference. 8 1 Despite some effort toward disarmament by the
United States and the Soviet Union,82 critics of the NPT were still not
convinced of the nuclear-weapons states' commitment to disarmament.
73
74
75
76

id.
NPT, supra note 3, art. IX(3).
See generally SINGH, supra note 24, at 7-11.
See id. at 6-8.
77 Id. at 7.
78 NPT, supra note 3, art. VI.
79 Id. art. X(2).
8o GRAHAM, supranote 11, at 257-58.

"t Id. at 258.
82

See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater,

Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into Force Oct. 10, 1963); ABM Treaty, supra
note 10; Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462; Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
June 18, 1979, U.S.-USSR, S. EXEc. DOc. Y, 96-1 (1979) (did not enter into force); Treaty on the
Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-USSR, S. TREATY DOc.
NO. 100-11 (1988); Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991,
U.S.-USSR, S. TREATY DOG. No. 102-20 (1991); Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
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Elements of the Bargainfor Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995

Ultimately, member states agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely at
the NPT 1995 Review Conference, but nuclear-weapons states were forced
to make some new promises in exchange for support from critics. Two of
the demands relate to NWFZs: Non-nuclear states called on nuclearweapons states to (1) provide legally binding negative security assurances
and (2) support the spread of regional NWFZs. 83 The 1995 Final Document
on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
("Final Document") strikes a bargain between nuclear-weapons states and
non-nuclear-weapons states for indefinite extension of the NPT with
84
language that meets these competing demands.
Paragraph 8 of the Final Document calls for stronger negative security
assurances for non-nuclear-weapons states. 85 There are two types of security
assurances.86 Positive security assurances are promises to come to another
nation's aid if it is attacked with nuclear weapons. 87 Negative security
assurances are promises to refrain from attacking particular nations with
nuclear weapons.88 As long as nuclear-weapons states are allowed to
maintain nuclear arsenals, the security of non-nuclear-weapons states rests in
legally binding negative security assurances. 89 In exchange for the promise
not to acquire nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapons states reasoned that
nuclear-weapons states should promise not to target them with their
90
remaining weapons.

Under paragraph 8, the United States, along with the other NPT
nuclear-weapons states, made a formal statement extending negative security
guarantees to member states of the NPT. 9' This unilateral declaration,
however, is not a uniform and legally binding assurance 92 because nuclearOffensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-USSR, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-1 (1993); Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991).
83 See SINGH, supra note 24, at 8.
Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, paras. 5-8.
It states that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapons States party to the
Treat against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." Id. para. 8, at 970.
Sanders, supra note 38, at 2.
87 See id. For example, the United States could promise to defend Taiwan if it were
attacked by
China. Id.
88 See id.
" See id. at 8.
90 See id. at 5.
" Statement on Security Assurances of the United States of America, Apr. 6, 1995, reprintedin 18
DISARMAMENT 224, n.2 (1995) (hereinafter Security Assurances Document].
92 Sanders, supra note 38, at 9.
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weapons states have not negotiated a universal instrument to codify nuclearweapons states' security assurances.9 3 Until they do so, NWFZs are the only
assurances. 94
legal instruments that include legally binding negative security

The Final Document also requires nuclear-weapons states to support
regional NWFZs. It states:
The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones ...

should be

encouraged as a matter of priority ....The cooperation of all
the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for
relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness
of such 95nuclear-weapon-free zones and their relevant
protocols.

SEANWFZ, signed in 1995, is the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations' ("ASEAN") attempt to isolate Southeast Asia from nuclear threats
by supporting non-proliferation and providing an instrument to enforce
legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapons states.96

IV.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEARWEAPON-FREE ZONE

SEANWFZ is a NWFZ resulting from decades of cooperation
following the formation of ASEAN in 1967.97 No current ASEAN member
state has ever possessed nuclear weapons, and a majority of the member
states condemned nuclear weapons even before any concrete proposals for a
NWFZ were advanced.98 Furthermore, all ten of ASEAN's current members
signed the NPT. 99

" Id. at 8-9.
94 Id. at 14.
95 Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, paras. 6-7.
Carolina G. Hernandez, Southeast Asia-The Treaty of Bangkok, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE
ZONES, supra note 20, at 81.
9' Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233, 1234 (1967).
98 SINGH, supra note 24, at 27.
99 Id. ASEAN members include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Darussalam, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.
Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233 (1967) (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore
formed ASEAN in 1967); Declaration of the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, Jan. 7, 1984, http://www.asean.or.id/1219.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002)
(Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984); Declaration on the Admission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, July 28, 1995, http://www.asean.or.id/2090.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2002) (ASEAN admitted Vietnam in 1995); Declarationon the Admission of the Union of
Myanmar into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Jul. 23, 1997, http://www.asean.or.id/1829.htm
(last visited on Nov. 11, 2002) (Myanmar (Burma) joined in 1997); Declarationon the Admission of the
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From its inception, ASEAN members have focused on major security
challenges. One of the greatest challenges was deflecting the deployment of
nuclear weapons in the region during the Cold War. 0 0 For example,
ASEAN signed the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which turned the
spotlight on the regional spread of communist insurgencies, internal
tensions, and civil strife. 0 1 The document recognized the threat presented
by superpower conflicts and noted the impacts that international conflict
could have on economic growth and political stability. 10 2 Southeast Asian
conference participants pledged to channel their political resolve into
creating a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
10 3
("ZOPFAN") without intervention from external powers.
ASEAN's first summit in 1976 produced two major developments in
its regional security relationships:'0 4 the Bali Declaration' 0 5 and the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation ("TAC"). 10 6 The Bali Declaration of ASEAN
Concord listed the goals and principles of cooperation and included plans for
both economic and functional cooperation.' 0 7 The TAC upheld respect for
08
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of ASEAN member states. 1
It called for non-interference in domestic affairs and peaceful dispute
settlement, 0 9 and it rejected the formation of a military alliance. 10 The
TAC put outside powers on notice that ASEAN was not a military
alliance.'11

Lao People's Democratic Republic into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Jul. 23, 1997,
http://www.asean.or.id/1827.htm (last visited on Nov.1 , 2002) (Laos joined in 1997); Declaration on the
Admission of the Kingdom of Cambodia into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Apr. 30, 1999,
http://www.asean.or.id/703.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (Cambodia was admitted into ASEAN in
1999).
10 See SINGH, supra note 24, at 27-28, 32.
1o1 See Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lampur Declaration), Nov. 27,
1971, http://www.aseansec.org/11823.htm (last visited June 2, 2002) [hereinafter ZOPFAN Declaration].
This Declaration represents a statement by its signatories of their intention to promote peace, freedom, and
neutrality in the region through further dialogue and cooperation. SINGH, supra note 24, at 28-30.
102 ZOPFAN Declaration, supra note 101.
103Id.
104Hernandez, supra note 96, at 82.
"05 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Declaration), Feb. 24, 1976,
http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm (last visited June 2, 2002).
106Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, reprinted in MICHAEL LEIFER,
ASEAN AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 170 (1989), available at

http://www.aseansec.org/l1820.htm (last visited June 2, 2002).
107 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Declaration), supra note 105.
:08 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, supra note 106.
09 Id.

':0 Hemandez, supra note 96, at 82.
] 1Id.
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ASEAN did not form SEANWFZ until 1995, after the NPT Review
Conference. 12 However, the idea was first introduced in 1984, between
1 13
Foreign ministers of
ASEAN's second (1977) and third (1989) summits.
ASEAN member nations were directed to develop the treaty at the fourth
summit in Singapore in 1992,114 and six members adopted it in 1995 at the
fifth summit in Bangkok. 15 Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar were
only non-member observers of ASEAN at the time, but they signed
SEANWFZ at the summit to make the treaty comprehensive.16
1 17
Territory
SEANWFZ covers the territory of all ten member states.
sea, archipelagic
territorial
h m118
"
•
is defined as the land territory, internal waters,

above them.
waters, the seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace
This includes the region's continental shelves and economic exclusive zones
("EEZs"). 119 SEANWFZ is a unique NWFZ because it covers parties'
EEZs. 12 °

The requirements of SEANWFZ are far reaching, including nonproliferation,1 1 restrictions on transportation and stationing of nuclear
weapons by non-members, 122 and prohibitions on dumping radioactive
waste. 123
Article III states that parties to SEANWFZ must not develop,
24
It
manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over nuclear weapons.
also states that parties cannot station, transport, test, or use nuclear weapons
anywhere inside or outside the NWFZ.' 25 Parties must also prohibit other
states from engaging in all of those activities, with the exception of

112 SEANWFZ, supra note 17.
"' Hernandez, supra note 96, at 83.

114Singapore Declaration (Jan. 28, 1992), http://www.aseansec.org/1163.htn (last visited June 2,
2002).
15 SEANWFZ, supra note 17.
116 Id.
' Id. art. I(a).
...Id. art. I(b).
119 Id. EEZs are defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. R.R.
CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 160 (3d ed. 1999) ("The exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
is a zone extending up to 200 miles from baseline, within which the coastal State enjoys extensive rights in
relation to natural resources and related jurisdictional rights, and third States enjoy the freedoms of
navigation, overflight by aircraft and the laying of cables and pipelines.").
12' See infra Part VIA.1 for a more extensive discussion of United States concerns regarding
coverage of EEZs in SEANWFZ.
12 SEANWFZ, supra note 17, art. III(l)(a), (1)(c), (2)(a), (2)(c), (4).
122 Id. art. III(1)(b), (2)(b).
123 Id. art. 111(3).
124 Id. art. IlI(i)(a).
"2 Id. art. III(1)(b)-(c).
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transporting nuclear weapons within their territory. 126 Article 111(3) further
27
prohibits dumping or discharge of radioactive wastes or materials. 1

Article VII gives members the choice of whether to allow transit by
other nations through methods not governed by the rights of (1) innocent
passage, (2) archipelagic sea-lanes passage, or (3) transit passage. 128 While
Article III states that parties to the treaty agree not to "station or transport
nuclear weapons by any means,"' 2 9 Article VII states that a party "may
decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its
ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation
by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and
' 30
overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters."'
Article IV governs the peaceful use of nuclear energy.'31 Parties must
not only follow IAEA safety regulations, but they must also negotiate
safeguard agreements to monitor compliance within eighteen months of the
32
Treaty's entry into force.'
Article X creates a verification system for SEANWFZ. 133 In addition
to IAEA safeguards, 134 the Treaty provides other mechanisms for policing
compliance. Members must submit reports and exchange information. 135
Other countries have access to these reports and can request clarification or
fact-finding missions. 136 Non-compliance is subject to IAEA rules and
procedures; 137 thereafter members can go to the UN Security Council or
General Assembly if a violation threatens international peace and security. 138
SEANWFZ provides two methods for withdrawing from the
agreement: a provision requiring treaty review after ten years, 13 and a
procedure for withdrawal.' ° While all other NWFZs are binding on
members indefinitely, members of SEANWFZ will review the Treaty's
126Id. art. HI(2).
127Id. art. I1(3). A reservation is a "unilateral statement... made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State .... " Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, art. II, § 1(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,333, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681.
:28 SEANWFZ, supra note 17, art. VII.
129 Id. art HI.
130 Id. art. VII.
131 Id. art. IV.
132 Id. art. IV(2), V.
'31 Id. art.
X.
...Id. art. X, V.
3' Id. art. XI.
:36 Id. art. X, XI, XII, XIII.
37 Id. art. XIV(3).
I3 Id. art. XIV.
139Id. art. XX.
'40 Id. art. XXII.
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effectiveness after ten years to determine whether it should remain in
force. 14 1 Parties have a right to withdraw from the Treaty if another party
breaches the agreement, but resigning parties must give twelve months
notice. 42 While provisions allow parties143to review and withdraw from the
treaty, parties may not make reservations.
Nuclear-weapons states can support the Treaty through its separate
Protocol. 144 Protocol signatories agree not to violate the terms of the Treaty
or the Protocol, and to provide negative security assurances to parties of the
Treaty.' 45 The Protocol to SEANWFZ is unique because it prohibits
signatories from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons anywhere
within the zone, regardless of whether the target is a SEANWFZ party or
not. 146 For example, the United States could not use nuclear weapons
against Chinese military targets at sea within the zone if it signed the
Protocol to SEANWFZ, even though China is a non-member.
ASEAN members contend that SEANWFZ is a successful model of
regional cooperation.1 47 Not only does it build upon the ZOPFAN
Declaration by setting up a regime to decrease the dangers of nuclear
weapons, nuclear testing, and radioactive contamination,' 148 but SEANWFZ
also contributes to non-proliferation, denuclearization, and disarmament as
required under the NPT. 14 9 Specifically, SEANWFZ is in accord with the
Final Document of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, which
encouraged the formation of NWFZs.' 50 It provides nuclear-weapons states
with the opportunity to heed the call of the 1995 NPT Review Conference to
support the formation of NWFZs.15 1 Finally, SEANWFZ shows ASEAN's
determination to protect the region52 from environmental pollution caused by
radioactive wastes and materials. 1
Successful implementation of SEANWFZ will promote Southeast
Asian security and environmental health, but without support from the
United States and other nuclear-weapons states it will be less effective. The
Bush Administration's deterrence-based rationale for refusing to sign the
141 Id. art. XX.
142 Id. art. XXII(2)-(3).
141Id. art. XVII.
'44Id. Protocol.
145Id. Protocol, art. I-II.
146Id. Protocol, art. II.
147 SINGH, supra note 24, at 40.
148 Hernandez, supra note 96, at 86-87.
149 SINGH, supra note 24, at 40.
150 Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, paras. 5-7.
'5 SEANWFZ, supra note 17, pmbl.
152 Id.
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Protocol to SEANWFZ is misguided because it violates current NPT
obligations and promotes the legitimacy of nuclear weapons at a time when
conventional deterrence is sufficient to prevent major conflicts.
V.

U.S. POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE
BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE NPT AND BOLSTERS THE LEGITIMACY OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence violates the letter and spirit of
the NPT.'5 3 U.S. reliance on deterrence not only discredits the U.S.
commitment to the NPT, 154 but it also conveys the message that nuclear
weapons are important instruments of power. Instead of protecting U.S.
interests, this deterrence posture promotes the acquisition of nuclear arms by
other states in order to defend against U.S. nuclear threats and regional
insecurities. 55 Furthermore, conventional military deterrence is as effective
as nuclear deterrence for the United States.'5 6
A.

U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence Violates the Letter and Spirit of the
NPT

U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence violates three specific NPT
commitments. 57 First, it violates Article VI, which requires concrete steps
toward disarmament from nuclear-weapons states.' 58 Instead of moving
toward full disarmament by signing the Protocol, the United States is
protecting its right to keep and use nuclear weapons. 59 Second, deterrencebased objections to arms control treaties violate the United States' pledge
under the Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference to extend
negative security assurances to all members of the NPT. 160 Third, the United
States also promised to support the spread of regional NWFZs at the 1995

153For an extended discussion of the illegality of nuclear deterrence, see FRANCIS A.
BOYLE, THE
CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (2002).
'54

See generally SING-I, supra note 24, at 55-58.

BUTLER, supra note 2, at 10-11, 34, 44.
156See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the effectiveness of conventional
deterrence.
57 See generally BOYLE, supra note 153. See supra Part III
for a discussion of the legal relationship
between NWFZs and the NPT.
1S NPT, supra note 3, art. VI. See also SiNGH, supra note 24, at 55-58.
'55

'59 For a discussion of the current Bush Administration's nuclear posture, see Deen, supra note 9.
160 Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, para. 8; Security Assurances Document, supra note

91; Hernandez, supra note 96, at 90.
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Review Conference, and that promise was not conditioned upon
maintenance of U.S. nuclear deterrence. 161
Even though U.S. promises were not legally binding, breaking those
promises violates the spirit of the NPT because they were made in exchange
for international support for indefinite extension of the NPT.1 62 Even if the
provisions of the Final Document of the 1995 Review Conference are not
legally enforceable against the United States, those declarations are the heart
of the basic bargain of the NPT. 163 The willingness of the United States to
fulfill these pledges will determine the fate of the NPT itself because nonnuclear-weapons states are reaching a threshold of tolerance.'

64

Ultimately,

the United
States' lack of commitment may cause the NPT regime to
65
unravel. 1
B.

Nuclear Deterrence Is a Counterproductive Strategy Because It
Supports the Legitimacy ofNuclear Weapons

The United States continues to rely on a policy of nuclear deterrence
despite the collapse of the bipolar nuclear deadlock of the Cold War.' 6 6 The
United States justifies its policy with concerns for a future resurgence of
Russian aggression, the risk of acquisition by a hostile "rogue" nation, or the
possibility of a nuclear, chemical, or biological strike by a terrorist
organization.' 67 Nuclear deterrence, however, is ill-suited to resolve these
threats; instead it exacerbates underlying
tensions and paradoxically
168
promotes a future nuclear catastrophe.
First, nuclear deterrence only aggravates the threats created by
Russia's large nuclear arsenal. 169 The emphasis in U.S. policy on nuclear
deterrence is counterproductive because it perpetuates the Cold War
Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, para. 7.
Jayantha Dhanapala, The Impact of September 11 on MultilateralArms Control, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Mar. 2002, at 14.
163 Id.
164 Id. See supra Part III for a discussion of non-nuclear-weapons states' concern that the NPT is
161
162

discriminatory when it allows a few states to wield nuclear weapons while preventing the rest from
acquiring them. North Korea, for example, claims that its recent withdrawal from the NPT was based on
fears of a pre-emptive nuclear strike by the United States, and allegations that the United States was using
the NPT and the IAEA as a tool to weaken North Korea. US. 'Hostile Policy' Blamed; Korea: The
North's Ambassador to the UN. Explains the Nation 's Decision to Withdraw From a Nuclear Treaty,
BALT. SUN, Jan. 11, 2003, LEXIS, News Group File.
163 Dhanapala, supra note 162, at 14.
166 JANNE E. NOLAN, AN ELUSIVE CONSENSUS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AMERICAN SECURITY
AFTER THE COLD WAR 87 (1999).
167

id.

:68

See generally id. at 87-102.

169 Id. at

91-92.
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mentality of distrust and provides Russia with a justification for maintaining
a large arsenal. 170 Russia's command and control systems are deteriorating,
which increases the risk of accidental or unauthorized launches. 1 71 Poor
economic conditions in post-Soviet states also promote the clandestine trade
of nuclear materials to state and non-state actors, facilitating proliferation to
parties who may be hostile to the United States.' 72 Instead of relying on
nuclear deterrence for security, the United States should emphasize steps to
reduce the Russian arsenal, which will require
concrete reciprocal steps to
73
reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Second, the United States' policy of nuclear deterrence may not deter
aggressive actions by "rogue" leaders. 74 Instead, this policy may give
hostile nations justification for seeking nuclear weapons. 75 For the past
decade, the United States has implemented a policy of "calculated
ambiguity" toward non-nuclear-weapons states, 176 implying a threat of
nuclear retaliation to deter a chemical or biological attack by hostile
states.' 77 One possible ramification of the "calculated ambiguity" policy is
that an enemy might test the U.S. commitment to its policy, ultimately
forcing the United States to either respond with nuclear weapons or back
down.
A disproportionate response by the United States might provoke
another nuclear-weapons state to deploy its arsenal either to defend the state
attacked by the United States or to restore the balance of power. 79 Backing
down ultimately exposes the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence as an idle
threat.' 80 Either outcome illustrates how U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence
may promote acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapons
8

states.'

1

Third, nuclear deterrence does not work against terrorists, due to the
8
diffused nature and multi-state membership of terrorist groups. 2
Deterrence requires the ability to identify the aggressor and target the
70 Id. at 91.
171 Id.
72 Id. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING THE

THREAT OF LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL 20-48 (1999) (outlining the risk of
leakage of nuclear weapons and materials from Russia).
173 NO.AN, supra note 166, at 92.
174Id. at 2.
175id.
:76 BUTLER, supra note 2, at 89.
77 Id.

171Id. at 90.
179id.
"10Id.at 90-91.
I8I NOLAN, supra note 166, at 92.
ld. at 100.
Is
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aggressor effectively. 183 Radical groups, however, work clandestinely in
urban areas, 184 often without state-backing. U.S. nuclear retaliation against
terrorist attacks would be extremely disproportionate because even precision85
targeting with nuclear weapons would cause grave civilian casualties.'
Moreover, terrorists who are motivated by deeply held political and
ideological beliefs are unlikely to fear a nuclear response because it would
deepen the anger of the survivors and further support their mission against
the United States. 186
Paradoxically, it is U.S. reliance on such
disproportionate means of retaliation that creates incentives for adversaries
to challenge
it with decentralized organizational structures and terrorist
87
attacks. 1
The United States cannot deal with the problem of international
terrorism without help from other nations. 188 It must support multilateral
agreements, such as the NPT, that make it more difficult for terrorist groups
to acquire nuclear materials and technologies. 189 No single country can
control all of the global exports, monitor all technology transfers, and
enforce all international legal obligations. 190 Multilateral agreements like
the NPT make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons, and
these regimes are more effective than attempts to contain the threat through
military supremacy. 19' The United States recently signed a treaty with
ASEAN to promote cooperation against terrorism in Southeast Asia. 192 The
United States should also sign the Protocol to SEANWFZ to show support
for the main instrument in Southeast Asia designed to prevent nuclear
acquisition and use by anyone in the region.

183 Id.

184Id. Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaida, for example, has a clandestine network within the United States
itself, making it practically impossible to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by some al-Qaida
cells. Gregory Katz, Terrorism FightNever Endingfor Europe, Israel, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28,
2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
185NOLAN, supra note 166, at 99. For example, the United States inflicted massive civilian casualties
in Afghanistan using conventional explosives nearly as powerful as tactical nuclear weapons in its fight
against al-Qaida. Keep the Anti-Nuke Torch Burning, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, LEXIS, News Group
File.
86 BUTLER, supra note 2, at 91.
187 NOLAN, supra note 166, at 2.
x88Dhanapala, supra note 162, at 13; BUTLER, supra note 2, at 92.
s9 Dhanapala, supra note 162, at 13; BUTLER, supra note 2, at 92.
190Dhanapala, supra note 162, at 13.
191 Id.
'92 United States of America-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism, Aug. 1, 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/12428.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
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Conventional Military Deterrence Is as Effective as Nuclear
Deterrence

Conventional military deterrence can replace nuclear deterrence,
because the gap between U.S. conventional forces and those of other armies
in the region is still broad enough that it would be difficult for any
opponents to effectively retaliate. 193 The United States' disproportionate
military strength was demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm in 1991
and in Kosovo in 1999.194 Therefore, the United States should take every
step possible to facilitate the denuclearization of the Asia-Pacific
to cement
95
its regional military superiority and deter regional conflicts.'
VI.

RECOMMENDATION:

THE

UNITED

STATES

SHOULD

SUPPORT

SEANWFZ
A.

U.S. Concerns with SEANWFZ Are Unfounded

The Clinton and Bush Administrations refused to sign the Protocol to
SEANWFZ due to disagreements over some of its provisions, specifically
(1) the inclusion of EEZs within the zone, and the effect that it could have
on freedom of navigation for U.S. warships; (2) the possibility of territorial
disputes between ASEAN members and China over the boundaries of the
96
zone; and (3) the scope of the negative security assurances in the Protocol.1
193

Mak Joon Num, Denuclearization in Northeast and Southeast Asia, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN

PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY 114, 122 (Derek da Cunha ed. 2000).
194 id.
195 Id.
196 Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord outlined U.S. objections in testimony
to Congress in
1996:
One of the most significant issues preventing us from supporting the treaty at this
point is the inclusion of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves in the
zone, which raises questions about the consistency of the treaty with high seas freedoms
and other principles embodied in UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. Furthermore,
continental shelves and EEZs have never been clearly delimited in the South China Sea,
which creates uncertainty over the scope of treaty and protocol obligations and could be a
source of conflict due to competing territorial claims in the region.
The U.S. has other concerns with the treaty and protocol including the precise
nature of the legally binding negative security assurances from protocol parties;
ambiguity of language concerning the permissibility of port calls by ships which may
carry nuclear weapons ....
Southeast Asia Regional Security Issues: Opportunitiesfor Peace, Stability, and Prosperity: Hearing
Before the Asia and Pacific Subcomm., House Int'l Relations Comm., FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
(May 30, 1996) (statement of Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Sec'y of State, Bureau of East Asian
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These concerns are unfounded, and the United States should sign the
Protocol to promote Southeast Asian security and uphold its duties under the
NPT.
1.

US. Concerns Over Freedom of NavigationAre Unfounded

The United States' main objection to SEANWFZ-that it covers
EEZs, which could limit freedom of navigation and prevent port calls by
nuclear-armed vessels-is unfounded because (1) SEANWFZ was designed
to be consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS"), (2) members are unlikely to block passage of United States
vessels, because they welcome the American military presence in the region,
and (3) signing the protocol would not substantially limit the nuclear
deterrence power of the United States, even if SEANWFZ members
197 decided
to block passage of its nuclear submarines throughout the zone.
First, SEANWFZ was designed to be consistent with the freedom of
navigation
198 provisions under UNCLOS. UNCLOS
19920 protects rights to innocent
passage, archipelagic sea-lanes passage, and transit passage.20 0 State
Department officials from the Clinton Administration expressed concerns
that Article III and Article VII of SEANWFZ, combined, allow members to
prevent free transit of nuclear-armed vessels protected by UNCLOS.2 °1
However, Article 11(2) of SEANWFZ explicitly states:
Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights or the exercise
of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982, in particular
with regard to freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent
passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of
ships and aircraft.

202

Moreover, ASEAN's effort to preserve freedom of navigation is further
evidenced in Article 111(2), which outlines activities that member states must
and Pacific Affairs), LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Lord]. This is the first time that the United
States has refused to sign a NWFZ protocol. Sinhaseni, supra note 44, at 66.
:97 Lord, supra note 196. See also GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 298.
98 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, pt. II, §3,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
'"' See id. Part IV, art. 53.
200 See id. Part III, §2.
201 SINGH, supra note 24, at 44.
202 SEANWFZ, supra note 17, art. 11(2).
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prohibit in their territories, but does not require member states to prohibit
transport of nuclear weapons through their territories. 20 3 Furthermore,
Article VII only gives members the right to control navigation "in a manner
not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes
passage or transit passage. 20 4
Second, SEANWFZ members are unlikely to block passage of United
States vessels because the member nations welcome the American military
presence in the region. 05 United States military presence in Asia, combined
with an array of bilateral alliances with Southeast Asian nations, constitutes
the security architecture of Southeast Asia.20 6 ASEAN members support the
U.S. military presence in the region, because they consider it the best
alternative to another state, such as Japan, China, or India providing the
same function.20 7 These states prefer the U.S. military presence because it

can preserve stability in the South China Sea,20 8 but it does
20 9 not have
territorial ambitions like other regional powers such as China.
Third, signing the Protocol would not substantially limit U.S. nuclear
deterrence, even if SEANWFZ members decided to block passage of U.S.
nuclear submarines throughout the zone. 210 U.S. military strategists favor
nuclear submarines over land and air-based nuclear delivery devices because
submergence allows them to survive a nuclear first-strike from an

adversary. 211 Nuclear submarines therefore strengthen nuclear deterrence by
practically guaranteeing a response capability after a nuclear attack by an
adversary.2 12 This function is not diminished if a small delay is added to the
response time of nuclear submarines, and delaying a retaliatory launch
would not increase the vulnerability of the vessels.213 At worst, SEANWFZ
203

Id. art. 111(2).

204 Id. art. VII.
205 Daijit Singh, Evolution of the Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN

PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, supra note 193, at 35, 57.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Renato Cruz De Castro, Managing "Strategic Unipolarity": The ASEAN States' Responses to the
Post-Cold War Regional Environment, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, supra note
193, at 60, 64. This concern drives efforts to keep the United States in the region even though many doubt
the likelihood of the United States involving itself militarily in the South China Sea. Mohamed Jawhar bin
Hassan, Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, supra note 193, at 98, 107.
209This has proven true regardless of United States pressures for democratization and human rights.
De Castro, supra note 208, at 74-75.
2 0 THE NUCLEAR TURNING POINT: A BLUEPRINT FOR DEEP CUTS AND DE-ALERTING OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 115-16, 141 (Harold A. Feiveson ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE NUCLEAR TURNING POINT].
211 Id.
212 Id. at 141; SMOKE, supra note 25, at 105.
213 THE NUCLEAR TURNING POINT, supra note 210, at 115-16, 141.
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could limit freedom of movement within a narrow area around Southeast
Asia, which would only add some time before the submarines could respond
to a hostile first-strike.
Finally, SEANWFZ is consistent with United States military policy.
U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons
on naval vessels. 214 Therefore, SEANWFZ members have no way of
knowing whether the United States is transporting nuclear weapons through
the zone.215 Furthermore, the United States is already drastically reducing
the number of nuclear submarines in its fleet and slashing the number of
warheads carried by each vessel.216 If the United States is already willing to
substantially reduce the size of its nuclear-armed vessels, then an
insignificant restriction on movement within the areas near Southeast Asia
will not substantially constrain U.S. nuclear strategy.
Recent Developments Between ASEAN and ChinaHave Reduced the
Risk of Conflict Over TerritorialDelimitation in SEANWFZ

2.

U.S. officials fear that the inclusion of EEZs in SEANWFZ may cause
territorial disputes with China,217 but recent evidence of China's improving
relationship with ASEAN should alleviate that fear. Territorial boundaries
are not authoritatively defined in the South China Seas, where a number of
parties have competing territorial claims with China.2t 8 U.S. officials worry
that the inclusion of EEZs in SEANWFZ will become a source of conflict
between ASEAN members and China.219 Recent events, however, allay that
fear. First, China and ASEAN have recently negotiated a free-trade
agreement, exemplifying their budding relationship. 220 Second, China
intends to sign the Protocol, and it could become the first nuclear-weapons
state to sign it. 221 China sent its notification of intent to sign the Protocol to
214

Thakur, supra note 20, at 28.

215 Id.
216
217

NOLAN, supra note 166, at 1; THE NUCLEAR TURNING POINT, supra note 210, at 115.
Lord, supra note 196; see also SINGH, supra note 24, at 43 (quoting Winston Lord, the United

States Assistant Secretary of State in 1996).
218 Lord, supra note 196; see also SINGH, supra note 24, at 43 (quoting Winston Lord, the United
States Assistant Secretary of State in 1996).
219 Lord, supra note 196; see also SINGH, supra note 24, at 43 (quoting Winston Lord, the United
States Assistant Secretary of State in 1996).
220 See China Ready to Work for Talks on Sino-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Zhu, XINHUA GEN. NEWS
SERV., Nov. 6, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File; Now for the Big One, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 9,
2001, at 1, LEXIS, News Group File.
221 Mutual Trust Between China, ASEAN Serves Regional Peace, Stability: Chinese Premier, XINHUA
GEN. NEWS SERV., Nov. 4, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File; Now for the Big One, supra note 220; SINGH,
supra note 24, at 50-5 1.
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SEANWFZ on July 27, 1999 during the Thirty-Second ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Meeting.222 China's willingness to work with ASEAN on the
Protocol stems from ASEAN's agreement to modify it by adding a statement
that "nothing in the Treaty or Protocol would affect existing territorial
boundaries., 223 Instead of heightening tensions between ASEAN members
and China, SEANWFZ has actually created an opportunity for regional
cooperation. 24
3.

Legally Binding Negative Security Assurances Under
SEANWFZ IncreaseRegional Security Without Weakening Nuclear
Deterrence

The United States objects to the negative security assurances outlined
in Article II of the Protocol to SEANWFZ.22 5 Specifically, the United States
disagrees with Sentence Two, which requires parties "not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZone. ' ' 2 26 Though the language of this provision is unclear, the U.S.
Department of State interprets this provision to extend to non-member
nations within the zone, and believes this extension would cripple the U.S.
nuclear deterrence posture in the region. 227
The United States previously offered negative security assurances to
all non-nuclear states as part of the bargain for indefinite extension of the
NPT.228 The Protocol to SEANWFZ would make them legally binding and
extend them to all states with forces in the zone.229 ASEAN is asking the
United States to bind itself legally to a promise that it already made.
The Protocol would not measurably weaken nuclear deterrence
because there are few situations where the United States would need to use
nuclear weapons within the zone. Admiral Dennis Blair, the United States
Navy Commander in Chief for the Pacific Command, listed three threats that
justify regional readiness: terrorism, North Korean aggression against South

222See SINGH, supra note 24, at 50.
223 Id. at 51.

Id.
225 Lord, supra note 196; see also SINGH, supra note 24, at 43 (quoting Winston Lord, the United
States Assistant Secretary of State in 1996).
226 SEANWFZ, supra note 17, Protocol, art. II.
227 SINGH, supra note 24, at 44.
22s Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, para. 8.
221 Security Assurances Document, supra note 91.
224
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Korea, and Chinese aggression against Taiwan. 230 Terrorist cells reside in
Southeast Asia, but nuclear deterrence is ill-suited to contain that threat
because terrorists are non-state actors. 231 Furthermore, no state in the region
actively harbors terrorist groups. 232 Korea and Taiwan are in Northeast Asia
beyond the area covered by SEANWFZ. 233 Therefore, the Protocol does not
234
limit U.S. nuclear use in response to North Korean or Chinese aggression.
The United States has a duty under the NPT to support treaties like
SEANWFZ and extend legally binding negative security assurances to non235
There are no threats to the United States
nuclear weapons states.
involving weapons of mass destruction in the region covered by the treaty.
Therefore, arguments against signing the Protocol based on concerns about
nuclear deterrence are unconvincing.
Finally, in the unlikely event that a war started in Southeast Asia, the
Protocol protects Southeast Asia from the dangers of nuclear war by
preventing nuclear use within the zone, regardless of the target.236 The
damaging regional effects of nuclear use do not decrease when weapons are
used against non-members of a treaty, and the Protocol allows ASEAN to
insulate itself from conflicts between external powers.23 7
The Bush Administration need not take such a hard line regarding
concerns about freedom of navigation and security assurances because
ASEAN will cooperate to gain support from nuclear-weapons states.
4.

ASEAN Will Negotiate with the United States to Resolve
DisagreementsOver the Protocol

U.S. concerns are unfounded because ASEAN seeks universal
membership in SEANWFZ and intends to work with nuclear-weapons states
to gain their support. ASEAN agreed that the Protocol would stay open for
review when it signed the Treaty in an effort to keep nuclear-weapons states
230 Hearing Before the House Armed Services Comm. on US. Pacific Command Posture, FDCH

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command), LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Blair].
23 See supra Part V.B for a discussion about why nuclear deterrence does not work against terrorists.
232 Blair, supra note 230.
233 SEANWFZ only covers the territory and EEZs of its parties, which are all ASEAN members.
SEANWFZ, supra note 17, art. I. North Korea and China are not SEANWFZ members. Id. art. I.
234 The negative security assurances in the Protocol to SEANWFZ only limit nuclear use within the
zone, not outside of it. SEANWFZ, supra note 17, Protocol, art. II.
2'' See supra Part I1.B for a discussion of the United States duty under the NPT to support the spread
of NWFZs and extend legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.
236 SEANWFZ, supranote 17, Protocol, art. II.
237 SINGH, supra note 24, at 32.
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involved in the process.238 ASEAN's willingness to work with China shows
that it is amenable to forming a consensus on the Protocol.239
Furthermore, ASEAN leaders are examining other controversial
provisions. ASEAN leaders are currently debating whether to amend the
Protocol so the negative security assurances do not cover member states'
EEZs. 210 ASEAN leaders are also studying the feasibility of drafting policy
statements to alleviate United States concerns about security assurances, the
outer limits of the zone, transit rights, and other issues. 241 The United States
should thus take initiative to work with ASEAN to develop a feasible
Protocol for all nuclear-weapons states.
B.

Advantages of US. Signature of the Protocolto SEANWFZ

The ultimate success of SEANWFZ depends upon the support of
nuclear-weapons states, and ASEAN needs U.S. support to preserve the
regime. Signing the Protocol will support regional non-proliferation and
security in Southeast Asia, and it will fulfill U.S. duties to support NWFZs
and provide legally binding negative security assurances under the NPT.
1.

U.S. Signature Will Solidify a Regime that Supports Regional
Security in Southeast Asia

By itself, SEANWFZ offers little to no protection beyond the
provisions of the NPT that prohibit nuclear acquisition without support from
nuclear-weapons states. 242 The region is not truly "nuclear-free" unless
nuclear-weapons states agree to uphold the treaty and promise not to station
or use nuclear weapons in the zone. Nuclear-weapons states are an essential
element of SEANWFZ, because ASEAN members have already agreed not
to acquire nuclear weapons under the NPT.243 SEANWFZ is the product of
regional cooperation, and it promotes stability in Southeast Asia by assuring
member states that their neighbors will not develop nuclear weapons. 244 The
United States should sign the Protocol to SEANWFZ to stabilize Southeast
Asian disarmament and support regional security.

238 SINGH, supra note 24, at 41.
239 See discussion, supra Part VI.A.2.
240SINGH, supra note 24, at 46.
24 Id. at 46-47.
242Thakur, supranote 20, at 12.
243SINGH, supra note 24, at 45.
244 Id. at 40.
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The U.S. Should Sign the Protocolto SEANWFZ to Uphold its
Duties Under the NPT and Promote Global Non-Proliferation

The Protocol to SEANWFZ provides the United States with an
opportunity to restore its credibility as a leader in the drive for global nonproliferation and disarmament.245 It serves to fulfill the United States'
Article VI requirements under the NPT to take steps toward global nuclear
disarmament.. Signing the Protocol will extend legally binding security
assurances to the ten ASEAN nations2 47 and facilitate the spread of
NWFZs.2 48 Support from the United States for SEANWFZ extends the
purposes of the NPT by making the whole southern hemisphere a nuclear249
free zone.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States has done little to support non-proliferation and
disarmament after the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Signing the
Protocol to SEANWFZ is a simple and meaningful way to bolster United
States non-proliferation credibility and support peace and stability in
Southeast Asia.
United States criticisms of the Treaty are unfounded. First, the United
States should not reject arms control treaties to maintain its policy of nuclear
deterrence. Nuclear deterrence violates the letter and spirit of the NPT and
maintains the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Second, incorporation of
EEZs in the zone will not substantially limit U.S. freedom of navigation and
nuclear deterrence. Third, SEANWFZ will not cause regional tension over
boundaries in the South China Sea because China is already working with
ASEAN to sign the Protocol and resolve misunderstandings. Fourth, the
negative security assurances in the Protocol will increase regional security
without significantly limiting U.S. nuclear deterrence. Finally, ASEAN is
willing to negotiate over specific elements of the Protocol in exchange for
signature, so the United States has an opportunity to influence the structure
of a major NWFZ.
Moreover, signing the Protocol to SEANWFZ will bolster U.S. and
world security. It is an opportunity for the United States to meet its duties
245See supra Part I for a discussion of the Bush Administration's visible move away from supporting
international non-proliferation agreements.
246 NPT, supra note 3, art. VI.
247SEANWFZ, supra note 17, Protocol, art. II; Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, para. 8.
243 Final Document, supra note 5, Annex, dec. 2, para. 7.
249 SINGH, supra note 24, at 53.

JANUARY

2003

UNITED STATES AND THE SEANWFZ PROTOCOL

261

under the NPT and support global nonproliferation. Signing the Protocol
would also help solidify SEANWFZ, which is an important element of
regional security in Southeast Asia. The world will be a safer place when
the southern hemisphere is free of nuclear weapons. The United States
government should play a leadership role toward realization of that vision.

